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RESPONSIBILITY FOR CUSTOMER LOSSES DUE TO
FAILURE OF CORRESPONDENT BROKERS AND
OTHER DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS
ARTHUR W. HAHN* AND EDWARD J. ZABROCKI**
INTRODUCTION
The default of Barings plc in February 19951 focused world atten-
tion on the dangers to futures exchanges 2 and brokerage firms posed
by nonmarket, or systemic, risk. In particular, the Barings crisis un-
derscored the difficulty in confining such risk to a single exchange,
especially in an environment characterized by growing interrelation-
ships between and among futures exchanges worldwide. Neverthe-
less, the Barings crisis revealed a strong willingness on the part of both
regulatory and self-regulatory authorities to work together to coordi-
nate the liquidation and transfer of positions and margin collateral
from Barings to other brokers with minimal market disruption. 3 Dire
predictions of a chain reaction of defaults spreading to other markets
and triggering a global financial meltdown did not materialize. 4 In-
stead, confidence in futures exchanges substantially remained intact
and market activity continued without significant interruption.5
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ern University.
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1. Following the Barings default, both the Bank of England and the Singapore Ministry of
Finance commissioned investigations into the causes of the default. The final reports prepared
by the investigators contain a detailed analysis of the events leading up to the collapse. See
BANK OF ENGLAND, REPORT OF THE BOARD OF BANKING SuPERVISION INQUIRY INTO THE CIR-
CUMSTANCES OF THE COLLAPSE OF BARINGS (1995); MICHAEL Lim CHOO SAN & NICKY TAN
NO KUANG, BARiNGs FUTURES (SINGAPORE) PTE LTD: THE REPORT OF THE INSPECTORS AP-
POINTED BY THE MINISTER FOR FINANCE (1995).
2. Unless otherwise noted, use herein of the term "futures exchanges" refers to exchanges
on which both futures and options on futures contracts are traded. In addition, unless otherwise
noted, any reference to "futures" or "options" is intended to refer to futures and options on
futures contracts traded on exchange markets, as opposed to similar instruments traded on over-
the-counter markets.
3. See Philip Coggan, Barings Crisis Tests Market, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1996, at 5.
4. See id.
5. During 1995, exchange volume on the Singapore International Monetary Exchange Ltd.
("SIMEX") actually increased by 0.8 percent, less than previous years' growth rates, but still
ahead of other world futures exchanges, some of which recorded double-digit declines. See id.
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The success of futures exchanges and their regulators in manag-
ing systemic risk, and in averting lasting adverse consequences follow-
ing the Barings default must, however, be qualified by the key role
played by Internationale Nederlanden Groep N.V. ("ING"). Immedi-
ately following the collapse, a United Kingdom bankruptcy court or-
dered a freeze on Barings' assets worldwide, including those used to
collateralize positions on futures exchanges, thereby depriving the ex-
changes of a major source of liquidity provided by an important mar-
ket participant. ING's agreement to purchase major portions of
Barings' assets and liabilities enabled the United Kingdom bankruptcy
court to rescind its order, thus forestalling more serious conse-
quences. 6 The intervention of ING, however, effectively precluded
the resolution of an important issue raised by the crisis: the question
of a broker's responsibility to its customers for the loss of customer
funds following the default of another ("correspondent") broker, an
exchange clearing organization, or a bank (hereinafter referred to col-
lectively as "depository institutions"). No clear consensus with re-
spect to the resolution of this issue exists and, absent such consensus,
there remains a level of uncertainty in a future default situation.
Existing regulatory systems rely on depository institutions to hold
funds and other property used to collateralize positions. The potential
delay in transferring positions and property used to margin such posi-
tions following the failure of depository institutions may impair the
short-term liquidity of both brokers and exchanges. To restore liquid-
ity, positions must be remargined; however, issues regarding the
source of the additional funds necessary to remargin such positions
are complex and subject to distinctly divergent interpretations.7
This Article will examine the alternative legal theories and argu-
ments likely to be advanced in any dispute involving issues of a bro-
ker's responsibility for customer margin property following the
default of a depository institution holding such property. To fully ap-
preciate the context of this debate, Part I will summarize the chain of
6. See, e.g., Joseph B. Dial, Status Report on Regulatory and Self-Regulatory Responses to
the Barings Bankruptcy, 18mn ANN. COMMODITIES L. INST. AND 4TH ANN. FIN. SERVICES L.
INST. (1995) ("[A] little luck - in the form of the Dutch firm, ING. ... [was] successful in confin-
ing the disaster to Barings and avoiding any wider, systemic consequences."); Eric Bettelheim,
Betrayal of Trust, MANAGED DERIVATIVES, Sept. 1995, at 18 ("[B]ut for... ING Bank.. . there
would have been a failure of other financial institutions which dealt with Barings and a landslide
of litigation that would have made the tin crisis and Hammersmith and Fulham look like small
beer.").
7. See, e.g., David Nusbaum, When Banks Go Bust, FUTURES, July 1995, at 62.
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transactions created in the course of effecting futures and options
transactions on both domestic and foreign exchanges. Part I also will
summarize the regulations imposed by United States and United
Kingdom regulatory authorities applicable at each link in the chain.
Despite extensive regulation, customer property is not immune from
invasion and Part II will examine these dangers and discuss regulatory
efforts aimed at mitigating them.
Included among the threats to customer property described in
Part II is the potential default of the customer's broker. The rules
applicable in the United States to commodity broker defaults provide
that customer property includes the assets of the broker to the extent
that the amount of funds segregated on customers' behalf is insuffi-
cient to meet all customer losses. At least one factual circumstance
may arise, however, that complicates the application of the default
rules. To limit the scope of their duties, implied or otherwise, many
brokers have inserted clauses into their customer agreements excul-
pating the broker from liability for losses caused by events beyond the
broker's control, such as the default of a depository institution. The
general enforceability of such clauses in a default context has never
been tested.
Additionally, where a broker possesses sufficient capital reserves
to meet its minimum financial requirements and remains in operation
following the default of a depository institution, the default rules do
not apply and the solvent broker may be able to argue that it bears no
liability to its customers to make up any shortfall in such customers'
segregated accounts, particularly if it has a valid exculpatory clause in
its customer agreement. Customers arguing in favor of imposing lia-
bility on the broker may rely on several sources, including the com-
mon law treatment of the relationship between brokers and their
customers, the legislative history of the segregation provisions of the
Commodity Exchange Act (the "Act")8 and subsequent judicial and
administrative pronouncements. Part III will examine each of these
sources as well as evaluate the general enforceability of exculpatory
clauses and the effect an enforceable exculpatory clause may have on
a broker's obligations to its customers.
8. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-26 (1994).
1996]
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I. CUSTOMER MARGIN AND SEGREGATION: THE "CHAIN" OF
TRANSACTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE
UNITED KINGDOM
Before analyzing the arguments surrounding a broker's liability
for a customer's margin property following the default of a depository
institution, it is necessary first to have an understanding of the com-
plex chain of relationships created in effecting futures transactions
both on domestic and foreign futures exchanges. Prior to the Barings
collapse, many brokerage firms and banks engaging in the brokerage
business marketed their ability to provide "seamless access" to the
world's futures exchanges. A single phone call to a domestic account
executive was all that was necessary to trade on any foreign or domes-
tic futures exchange, with the attendant margin transaction handled
domestically in the home currency and confirmed on the customer's
combined statement. While emphasizing the relationship between
the customer and the initiating broker with its worldwide reach, the
concept of seamless access blurred the existence of an underlying
chain of relationships among correspondent brokers, clearing organi-
zations and bank depositories. The Barings collapse focused attention
on this network of relationships and compelled a new appreciation of
the presence of systemic risk at each link in the chain. In addition, the
collapse highlighted major differences among exchanges in the man-
ner of calculating margin, in segregation requirements, and in the
level of regulatory oversight, 9 while underscoring the potential
problems created by conflicting bankruptcy regimes in different juris-
dictions.' 0 This Section will describe the movement of customer funds
from the customer through various depository institutions to margin
futures transactions on both domestic and nondomestic exchanges.
The applicable regulations at each stage also will be summarized to
provide an understanding of the safeguards imposed by the regulatory
system in both the United States and the United Kingdom.
A. The United States Regulatory Environment
1. Futures and Options Transactions by United States Persons on
Domestic Exchanges
United States customers placing orders on domestic contract
markets must first have deposited sufficient funds, securities or other
9. See Nicholas Denton, Barings Sparks Tougher Line in Singapore, FiN. TIMES, Nov. 6,
1995, at 24.
10. See Bettetheim, supra note 6, at 18.
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property" to meet the initial margin requirements for the particular
contract traded. The exchange clearing organization 12 establishes dif-
ferent minimum initial margin amounts for different contracts based
on several factors, including historical price volatilities, current and
anticipated market conditions, and other relevant information. The
initial margin amount established by a futures commission merchant
("FCM") 13 may be greater than the minimum levels established by the
exchange. In establishing the initial margin amount for its customers,
an FCM normally considers several factors, including, for example,
the amount of margin the FCM itself will have to place with the clear-
ing organization or a correspondent FCM, the customer's purpose in
engaging in the trade (i.e., whether for speculative or for hedging pur-
poses), the customer's creditworthiness, and the credit risk assumed
by the FCM resulting from the volatility inherent in the contract and/
or trading strategy selected by the customer. Subsequent adverse
movements in daily settlement prices will result in customers being
required to post additional collateral, known as variation margin.
Favorable price movements, on the other hand, result in credits to the
customer's account, which amount may be withdrawn thereafter. Af-
ter the customer closes the position, the FCM will return the initial
margin amount, along with any additional margin amounts, to the
customer.
If the customer's FCM is a clearing member 14 of the exchange on
which the customer's order is executed, the FCM will post margin di-
ll. The regulations prohibit the use of certain property as segregated funds, including:
a) Money invested in obligations or stocks of any clearing organization or in member-
ships in or obligations of any contract market; or (b) money held by any clearing organ-
ization which it may use for any purpose other than to purchase, margin, guarantee,
secure, transfer, adjust, or settle the contracts, trades, or commodity options of the
commodity or option customers of such futures commission merchant.
17 C.F.R. § 1.24 (1996).
12. "Clearing organization" is defined as "the person or organization which acts as a me-
dium for clearing transactions in commodities for future delivery or commodity option transac-
tions, or for effecting settlements of contracts for future delivery or commodity option
transactions, for and between members of any contract market." Id. § 1.3(d).
13. The Commodity Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC") defines a "futures commission
merchant" as:
Individuals, associations, partnerships, corporations, and trusts engaged in soliciting or
in accepting orders for the purchase or sale of any commodity for future delivery on or
subject to the rules of any contract market and that, in or in connection with such
solicitation or acceptance of orders, accepts any money, securities, or property (or ex-
tends credit in lieu thereof) to margin, guarantee or secure any trades or contracts that
result or may result therefrom ....
Id. § 1.3(p).
14. A "clearing member" is defined as "any person who is a member of, or enjoys the
privilege of clearing trades in his own name through, the clearing organization of a contract
market." Id. § 1.3(c).
1996]
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rectly with the clearing organization. If the customer's FCM is not a
clearing member, then the FCM will effect the trade through another
FCM that is such a member. The clearing member FCM will collect
margin from the nonclearing member and post the requisite margin
amount with the clearing organization.
The rules of each exchange govern the amount of margin re-
quired to be deposited by the clearing member with the clearing or-
ganization in connection with each contract traded on such exchange,
and the manner in which margin is calculated and collected. The man-
ner in which margin is calculated and collected is important in deter-
mining the sources and the amount of liquidity available to the system
upon the default of a broker. For example, clearing members of the
Chicago Mercantile Exchange ("CME") collect margin from corre-
spondent brokers and customers and deposit such margin with the
CME Clearing House on a "gross" basis, that is, without regard to
whether the positions from various sources for which margin is col-
lected offset one another. 15 Other exchanges, like the Chicago Board
of Trade ("CBOT"), also require that member firms collect margin
from customers on a gross basis.16
However, in calculating the amount of margin to be deposited by
clearing members with the clearing organization, these exchanges per-
mit clearing members to net the margin requirements of offsetting
trades. For example, a clearing member required to deposit margin
with the clearing organization on a net basis and which carried posi-
tions that were long 99 contracts and short 100 of the same contracts
would only need to deposit with the clearing organization the margin
obligation associated with 1 contract. In contrast, under a gross mar-
gin system, the clearing member would have to deposit the margin
required by 199 contracts. Exchange rules that calculate the required
margin deposit based on a clearing member's gross positions will, all
else being equal, result in a greater amount of margin to be deposited
with the clearing organization and will "provide[ ] greater immediate
assurance that market participants have the financial ability to support
their market activity."'1 7 Where clearing members are allowed to net
their positions before calculating their margin obligation, the clearing
organization will hold correspondingly less margin. Consequently, in
the event of a broker default, the clearing organization may find it
15. See Chicago Mercantile Exchange, The Financial Safeguard Systems of the Chicago Mer-
cantile Exchange, at 3 (1995).
16. See Board of Trade Clearing Corp. Bylaws 504, 508 (Mar. 11, 1996).
17. Chicago Mercantile Exchange, supra note 15, at 3.
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more difficult to transfer positions without requiring the posting of
additional margin. In addition, some exchange rules permit clearing
members to net their customers' positions against their own proprie-
tary or "house" positions. This may result in an even smaller margin
amount deposited with the clearing organization. 18
The Act and the regulations promulgated thereunder 19 establish
neither the amount of margin that must be collected from customers
by FCMs or from clearing members by clearing organizations, nor
whether clearing organizations may collect margin from clearing
members on a gross or net basis. Rather, § 4d(2) of the Act 20 and the
associated regulations require FCMs to account separately for and
segregate customer positions and property from those belonging to
the FCM. These so-called "segregation rules" prohibit FCMs from
using customer property to margin the trades of other customers or of
the FCM itself.21 For trades on domestic markets, each FCM and
clearing organization in the chain of transactions outlined above must
adhere to the segregation rules.22 In addition to requiring the segre-
gation of customer funds, the regulations further limit the scope of
permissible uses for such funds. Each FCM may deposit customer
property with another (or "correspondent") FCM, with the clearing
organization, or with a bank or trust company.2 3 The deposit must be
18. This issue became significant in the Barings collapse as Barings Securities (Japan) Lim-
ited, a clearing member of both the Osaka Securities Exchange and the Tokyo Stock Exchange,
was required under exchange rules to collect client margin on a gross basis, but could net the
margin required by offsetting proprietary positions before depositing margin with the clearing
organization. See BANK OF ENGLAND, supra note 1 at 202. Other exchanges do not permit
customer and house positions to be netted against one another. See, e.g., Board of Trade Clear-
ing Corp. Bylaw, supra note 16, at 511 ("[T]rades designated by the member as for his customer
shall not be offset under Bylaw 504 against trades designated by the member as for his own
account.").
19. 17 C.F.R. §§ 1.1-190.10.
20. 7 U.S.C. § 4d(2) (1994).
21. See id.; 17 C.F.R. §§ 1.20(a), 1.22.
22. Each [FCM] shall treat and deal with the customer funds of a commodity customer
... as belonging to such commodity or option customer. All customer funds shall be
separately accounted for, and shall not be commingled with the money, securities or
property of a[n FCM] or of any other person, or be used to secure or guarantee the
trades, contracts or commodity options, or to secure or extend the credit, of any person
other than the one for whom the same are held.
17 C.F.R. § 1.20(c).
23. Neither the Act nor the regulations define the terms "bank" or "trust company." In
contrast, the Securities Exchange Act defines a "bank" as:
(A) a banking institution organized under the laws of the United States, (B) a member
bank of the Federal Reserve System, (C) any other banking institution, whether incor-
porated or not, doing business under the laws of any State or of the United States, a
substantial portion of the business of which consists of receiving deposits or exercising
fiduciary powers similar to those permitted to national banks under the authority of the
Comptroller of the Currency pursuant to section 92a of title 12, and which is supervised
and examined by State or Federal authority having supervision over banks, and which
19961
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in an account name that clearly identifies the property as belonging to
the customer and indicates that the funds are segregated as required
by the Act and regulations.24 In addition, FCMs depositing customer
funds must receive from the depository an acknowledgment that the
depository was informed that the deposits belong to customers of the
FCM and are being held in accordance with the provisions of the Act
and regulations.2 5
Instead of depositing customer funds with a bank, the regulations
also allow FCMs to invest such funds in certain "permitted invest-
ments," including obligations of the United States, general obliga-
tions of any state or any political subdivision thereof, or obligations
fully guaranteed as to principal and interest by the United States.26
Moreover, FCMs may use customer segregated funds to purchase cer-
tain permitted investments from a bank or other qualifying entity (the
"repo counterparty") pursuant to a repurchase agreement wherein the
repo counterparty agrees to buy back the securities at a fixed time and
price in the future or a reverse repurchase agreement wherein the
repo counterparty agrees to sell back the securities at a fixed time and
price in the future. FCMs may enter into such agreements only if cer-
tain conditions prescribed by the CFTC's Division of Trading and
Markets have been met.2 7
Similar to the regulations applicable to bank deposits, FCMs that
invest customer funds in permitted investments must separately ac-
count for and segregate such investments from the FCM's own prop-
erty.28 In addition, the depository (whether a bank, trust company,
correspondent FCM, or clearing organization) must permit represent-
is not operated for the purpose of evading the provisions of this chapter, and (D) a
receiver, conservator, or other liquidating agent of any institution or firm included in
clauses (A), (B), or (C) of this paragraph.
15 U.S.C. § 78(c)(6) (1994).
24. See 17 C.F.R. § 1.20(a).
25. The regulations also prohibit any person, including any clearing organization or any
depository, that has received customer property for deposit in a segregated account from hold-
ing, disposing of, or using any such property as belonging to any person other than the customers
of the FCM that made the deposit. See id.
26. See 17 C.F.R. § 1.25.
27. The specific conditions are detailed in Division of Trading and Markets, Financial and
Segregation Interpretation No. 2-1, [1992-1994 Transfer Binder] 1 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) I
7112A (Dec. 15, 1993).
28. See 17 C.F.R. § 1.26(a). If the FCM subsequently deposits such permitted investments
with a bank, trust company, clearing organization or other FCM, it must do so under an account
name that clearly identifies the obligations as belonging to customers and the deposits must be
segregated as required by the Act and the regulations. See id. Upon opening such an account,
the FCM must obtain and retain in its files, in accordance with 17 C.F.R. § 1.31, an acknowledg-
ment from the depository that the depository was informed that the obligations belong to the
FCM's customers and are being held in accordance with the Act and regulations. See id.
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atives of the CFTC to inspect the FCM's investment of customer
funds at any reasonable time.29
2. Futures and Options Transactions by United States Persons on
Foreign Exchanges
The CFTC's regulations with respect to trading on foreign futures
exchanges embody a concept that is similar, but not identical to, segre-
gation.30 Under the CFTC's regulations, an FCM must separately seg-
regate sufficient customer funds to meet the obligations of United
States domiciled customers trading on foreign markets (the "Secured
Amount"). The Secured Amount, in general, is equal to the lesser of:
(a) the net liquidating equity; or (b) the sum of margin required, plus
or minus open trade equity and options premiums in respect of posi-
tions held for all such customers.31 Secured Amount funds may not be
commingled with customer funds required to be segregated under
29. See id.
30. In general, the Act imposes no restrictions on foreign futures products which may be
offered or sold to United States customers. Certain special procedures, however, are required
for the offer or sale to United States customers of foreign stock index futures and options con-
tracts based on foreign government debt obligations. For foreign stock index futures and op-
tions, the CFTC's Office of General Counsel issues no-action letters to allow the offer and sale
of each such contract to a United States person. See, e.g., Tokyo Stock Exch. Futures Contract
Based on the Tokyo Stock Price Index, CFTC-OGC Interpretative Letter No. 92-2, [1990-1992
Transfer Binder] 2 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 25,210 (Jan. 16, 1992); Osaka Securities Exch.
Nikkei Stock Average Futures Contract, CFTC-OGC Interpretative Letter No. 92-1, [1990-1992
Transfer Binder] 2 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 25,209 (Jan. 16, 1992). Debt obligations of a
foreign country must be designated as an exempted security by the United States Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC") under SEC Rule 3a12-8 before a futures contract, or option
contract based thereon, can be offered or sold to a United States person. See generally, William
J. Brodsky, The Globalization of Stock Index Futures: A Summary of the Market and Regulatory
Developments in Stock Index Futures and the Regulatory Hurdles Which Exist for Foreign Stock
Index Futures in the United States, 15 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 248 (1994).
Effective March 18. 1996, the CFTC amended rule § 30.3(a) to eliminate the requirement
that the CFTC issue an order authorizing the offer and sale of a particular foreign exchange-
traded commodity option before it can be offered or sold in the United States. See Foreign
Commodity Options, 61 Fed. Reg. 10.891 (CFTC 1996) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 30.3).
While a formal CFTC order approving a foreign option under rule § 30.3(a) is no longer re-
quired under any circumstances, the rule change does not affect existing Act restrictions related
to stock indices and foreign government debt. See id. However, if the underlying foreign ex-
change-traded futures product (including futures on stock indices and foreign government debt)
may be offered or sold in the United States, the foreign option based on that futures contract
may be offered or sold as well without further action. See id.
31. See 17 C.F.R. § 30.7(a). An FCM may commingle with the Secured Amount funds held
for or on behalf of other customers of the FCM who wish to trade foreign futures or options
(e.g., foreign domiciled customers). If the Secured Amount is commingled with the funds of
such other customers, the amount that must be deposited in the separate account must be no less
than the greater of:
1) the ... secured amount plus the amount that would be required to be on deposit if
all such customers were [United States domiciled customers], or 2) the . . . secured
amount plus the amount required to be held in a separate account... for or on behalf
of customers pursuant to any law, or rule, regulation or order thereunder, or any rule of
1996]
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§ 4d of the Act.32 Like segregated funds, the Secured Amount must
be held and accounted for apart from an FCM's own funds in a sepa-
rate account located at an acceptable depository (the "Separate Ac-
count"). 33 The account name must indicate clearly that the account
contains the funds of the FCM's customers.34 In addition, the FCM
must obtain from the depository a written acknowledgment stating
that the depository has been informed that the funds in the account
belong to the commodity futures and options customers of the FCM
and are being held in accordance with the CFTC's rules. 35
An FCM may invest Secured Amount funds in the same instru-
ments as permitted under the segregation rules,36 as well as: (a) eq-
uity and debt securities traded on a United States securities exchange;
and (b) commercial paper and other debt instruments rated in one of
the top two rating categories by Standard & Poor's Corporation or
Moody's Investor Services, Inc. In addition, each FCM must compute
on a daily basis: (a) the total amount of funds on deposit in the Sepa-
rate Account; (b) the total Secured Amount required to be on deposit;
and (c) the amount of the FCM's residual interest in such funds.37
3. Minimum Financial Requirements
The primary safeguard against the loss of customer funds result-
ing from the financial failure of an FCM is the segregation require-
ments; however, these requirements protect customers only if
followed by the FCM. To help insulate commodity futures customers
from losses resulting from the financial failure of FCMs, the CFTC
has established minimum financial requirements with which FCMs
must comply to retain their registration. Moreover, the CFTC has
stated that the minimum net capital amount required to be main-
any self-regulatory organization authorized thereunder, in the jurisdiction in which the
depository or the customer, as appropriate, is located.
17 C.F.R. § 30.7(b). Accordingly, the calculation of the Secured Amount depends on the follow-
ing factors: a) whether or not the foreign contract market is subject to a segregation rule; b)
whether the account containing the Secured Amount contains funds pertaining only to United
States domiciled customers or also contains funds related to foreign domiciled customers; and c)
whether the FCM chooses to set aside additional funds.
32. See 17 C.F.R. § 30.7(d).
33. A Separate Account may be maintained at the following depositories: a) a bank or trust
company located in the United States or as designated by the CFTC; b) another FCM; c) a
clearing organization of any foreign contract market; d) any member of such foreign contract
market; or e) such member or clearing organization's depository. See id. § 30.7(c).
34. See id.
35. See id. § 30.7(c)(5).
36. See supra text accompanying note 26.
37. See 17 C.F.R. § 30.7(f).
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tained is intended to be sufficient to provide commodity customers
with adequate protection in light of current industry conditions. 38 A
detailed discussion of the CFTC's minimum financial requirements is
beyond the scope of this article. 39 Nevertheless, several points should
be noted.
Generally speaking, an FCM must maintain "adjusted net capi-
tal" in an amount equal to or greater than four percent of the com-
bined amount of customer segregated funds and the aggregate
Secured Amount held by the FCM (less the market value of customer
commodity options).4 0 "Net capital" is broadly defined as the excess
of current assets over liabilities.41 If adjusted net capital were to de-
cline to six percent of the combined amount of customer segregated
funds and the Secured Amount (less the value of customer commodity
options), the so-called "early warning" level, the FCM would be re-
quired to notify the CFTC.42 If adjusted net capital were to decline
below the four percent minimum level discussed above, the FCM
would be required to notify the CFTC within twenty-four hours43 and,
within another twenty-four hours thereafter, file a statement of finan-
cial condition, a statement showing the minimum net capital calcula-
tion, and a statement of its segregation and Secured Amount
requirements and the funds held in segregated accounts and Separate
Accounts.44 Furthermore, an FCM unable to maintain the minimum
38. See Futures Commission Merchants: Minimum Financial Requirements, 42 Fed. Reg.
27,166, 27,166 (CFTC 1977) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 1) (proposed May 26, 1977).
39. For a detailed discussion, see Jerry W. Markham & Thomas Lee Hazen, Broker-Dealer
Operations Under Securities and Commodities Law § 5.13 (Clark Boardman Callaghan Securities
Law Series vol. 23A, 1995).
40. See Minimum Financial Requirements for Futures Commission Merchants and Intro-
ducing Brokers, 61 Fed. Reg. 19,177, 19,186 (CFTC 1996) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R.
§ 1.17(a)(1)(i)). The reduction for the market value of commodity options is limited to the
amount of customer funds in such customer(s) accounts and Secured Amounts. See id. For
FCMs that also are securities broker-dealers, the adjusted net capital amount must equal or
exceed the amount of net capital required by 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(a). See id. 17 C.F.R.
§ 1.17(a)(2)(i) excludes an FCM from the foregoing adjusted net capital requirements so long as
the FCM is a member of a Designated Self-Regulatory Organization ("DSRO") and conforms to
that DSRO's minimum financial standards and reporting requirements. Note, however, that
such financial standards and reporting requirements never result in a "lower" minimum net capi-
tal requirement.
41. See id. § 1.17(c)(1). "Current assets" includes cash and other assets expected to be real-
ized in cash or sold within the next twelve months. See id. § 1.17(c)(2).
42. The "early warning" level is triggered if adjusted net capital falls below 150% of the
amount specified in 17 C.F.R. § 1.17(a)(1)(i) or 6% of the combined amount of customer segre-
gated funds and the foreign futures and options Secured Amount (less the market value of com-
modity options), whichever is greater. See Maintenance of Minimum Financial Requirements by
Futures Commission Merchants and Introducing Brokers, 61 Fed. Reg. 19,177, 19,185 (CFTC
1996) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 1.12(b)).
43. See 17 C.F.R. § 1.12(a)(1).
44. See id. § 1.12(a)(2).
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amount of adjusted net capital must transfer all customer accounts
and immediately cease doing business as an FCM until it can demon-
strate compliance. 45
The CFTC's minimum financial requirements are important in
tracing the consequences of a depository institution default on an
FCM. As more fully discussed below, FCMs that have placed cus-
tomer funds with a depository institution will, following the default of
such institution, have to exclude the value of such deposits from the
current asset portion of its adjusted net capital calculation. If such
FCM lacks adequate capital reserves to offset the deposit, the FCM
may have to cease doing business. Though specific as to the direct
consequences to an FCM of the default of a depository institution, the
CFTC's minimum financial requirements do not address the responsi-
bility of an FCM for customer losses stemming from such default.
B. The United Kingdom Regulatory Environment
1. Futures and Options Transactions on Domestic and
Foreign Exchanges
Commodity brokerage firms in the United Kingdom must follow
the "Client Money Rules" issued by the Securities and Futures Au-
thority ("SFA"), a "self-regulating organization" which derives au-
thority from the United Kingdom's Financial Services Act 1986
("FSA").46 In contrast to the CFTC's segregation rules, the Client
45. See id. § 1.17(a)(4). Note that if the FCM immediately demonstrates to the CFTC's or
appropriate DSRO's satisfaction the ability to comply with the minimum capital requirements,
then the CFTC may, in its discretion, allow a 10-business-day grace period during which posi-
tions need not be transferred and the FCM need not cease doing business.
46. See Securities and Futures Authority ("SFA") Rules, published in 3 Fin. Servs. Rep.
(CCH) at 222,001 et seq., as amended by SFA Board Notice 297 (Dec. 20, 1995). The Securities
and Investment Board ("SIB") "dedesignated" its Client Money Regulations in November 1994.
See SFA Board Notice 297 (Dec. 20, 1995) (on file with authors). The SFA's new Client Money
Rules are a response to that dedesignation and completely replace the SFA Client Money Regu-
lations in effect as of December 20, 1995. The new SFA Client Money Rules went into effect on
February 1, 1996. Firms, however, had until June 30, 1996, to begin operating under the new
Client Money Rules. See id.
Under section 55 of the FSA, brokerage firms must keep "client money" in accordance with
rules and regulations issued by the "Secretary of State," who is given authority by the FSA to
"make regulations" regarding "clients' money." The Secretary's role has been reduced since the
FSA's enactment, and many of its duties, including those involving client money, have since been
transferred to the United Kingdom Treasury. See Transfer of Functions (Financial Services) Or-
der 1992, (SI 1992 No. 1315) (June 4, 1992), published in 2 Fin. Servs. Rep. (CCH) at 161,662.
Powers are further delegated to the United Kingdom's SIB, akin to both the United States SEC
and the CFTC. See Financial Services Act 1986 (Delegation) Order 1987, (SI 1987 No. 942)
(May 18, 1987), published in 2 Fin. Servs. Rep. (CCH) at 160,304; see also 1 Fin. Servs. Rep.
(CCH) 2-350.
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Money Rules permit certain customers to "opt out" of the restrictions
on the disposition of client money under certain circumstances.4 7
SFA Rules permit a "non-private customer"48 to "opt out" if such
customer has entered into a two-way customer agreement with the
brokerage firm stating that the customer's money "will not be subject
to the protections conferred by the Client Money Rules."'49 The
agreement must further state that because of the customer's election
to "opt out," the customer's money "will not be separated from the
money of the firm, and will be used by the firm in the course of the
'firm's' business, and the customer will therefore rank as a general
creditor of the firm."'50 Additionally, a customer may "opt out" of the
Client Money Rules if such customer is an ordinary business inves-
tor 51 or a market counterparty, 52 and the broker has sent to the cus-
tomer a separate written notice containing the same statements as
those found in the two-way customer agreement described above.53
If the customer elects not to "opt out" of the Client Money Rules,
"client money" must be held in a "client bank account" with an "ap-
proved bank."54 Client money and the client bank account must be
designated as such on the bank's records, thereby ensuring its segrega-
Like the United States, the United Kingdom depends on self-regulatory organizations
("self-regulating organizations" or "SROs") to enforce its commodities and securities laws.
Thus, commodity firms obtain authority to operate by membership in the SFA. See FSA § 8,
published in 2 Fin. Servs. Rep. (CCH) at 100,101; 1 Fin. Servs. Rep. (CCH) $ 2-600.
Hereinafter, "Rules" will refer to those of the SFA, and "Regulations" will refer to those of
the SIB.
47. See SFA Rule 4-52.
48. The term "private customer" includes both a customer who is an individual and who is
not acting in the course of carrying on investment business, and a customer who is a small busi-
ness investor not acting in the course of carrying on investment business. See SFA Rule 9-1.
49. SFA Rule 4-52.
50. Id.
51. An ordinary business investor includes, among other things, governmental entities, as
well as companies, partnerships and trusts that meet certain size and net asset requirements. See
SFA Rule 9-1.
52. A market counterparty means "a person dealing with a firm as principal or as agent for
an unidentified business of the same description as that in the course of which the firm acts."
SFA Rule 9-1.
53. See SFA Rule 4-52(2).
54. "Client money" is that customer money held for investment by the firm. See SFA
Board Notice 297, sched. 2, ch. 9 (Dec. 20, 1995). A "client bank account" is an account at an
approved bank held in the firm's name but with a title that distinguishes it from the firm's pro-
prietary account. See id. An "approved bank" includes, among others, the Bank of England or a
bank operating under the United Kingdom's Bank Act 1987. It also may include institutions
outside the United Kingdom, including central banks within the European Community ("EC")
and depositories both within and without the EC. See id; see also SFA Rules, App. 6 (list of SFA
approved institutions outside the United Kingdom).
A firm, however, cannot hold client money outside the United Kingdom unless such an
arrangement is disclosed to the customer. See SFA Rule 4-60. The customer must give written
consent to the arrangement unless the customer "ordinarily" resides outside the United King-
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tion from the firm's proprietary account. The firm must give written
notice to the bank requesting that the bank provide written acknowl-
edgment that the money is held by the firm as "trustee" and, there-
fore, is not subject to setoff or counterclaim by the bank against the
firm.55
Before the brokerage firm transfers client money to an exchange,
clearinghouse, or correspondent broker in order to effect margined
trades, the firm must notify such transferee that the firm is under an
obligation to deposit client money in a client bank account; instruct
the transferee that such money should be credited to the firm's client
account; and, as is the case with an approved bank, require the trans-
feree to provide written acknowledgment that the client account will
not be combined with any other account and is not subject to setoff in
satisfaction of a debt owed to the transferee under any other
account. 56
If either the approved bank, correspondent broker, or a settle-
ment agent entrusted with client money or property "defaults," the
firm must notify the SFA as soon as it learns of the default.57 The firm
must also notify the SFA "as soon as practically reasonable, of its in-
tention regarding making good any shortfall that has arisen or may
arise and the amounts involved. '58
dom and the firm has "reasonable grounds" to believe that the customer consents but does not
wish to give consent in writing. See id.
55. See SFA Rule 4-53(1) (money to be held in an "approved bank"); SFA Rule 4-54(1)
(notification to an approved bank); SFA Rule 4-55 (money segregated from firm's); SFA Rule 4-
56 ("general client bank accounts" and "designated client bank accounts").
Chapter 9 of the SFA Rules defines a "general client bank account" as an account which
holds client money of one or more customers. Upon the default of the bank, accounts in the
United Kingdom are pooled with all other client bank accounts of the firm except designated
client bank accounts. A "designated client bank account" is an account in which client money of
one or more customers is deposited, each customer having consented in writing to the use of the
approved bank holding the client money; and, upon bank failure, the account is not pooled with
any other account or type of account. It is questionable whether a designated account adds any
greater protection to customers when the depositor bank is an affiliate of the firm or acting in
the role of broker itself. See Bettelheim, supra note 6, at 18 (suggesting the possibility that
"designated trust accounts will be pooled with other deposits and will be available for the bank's
general creditors").
56. See SFA Rule 4-62. The same rule generally applies when "customers' approved collat-
eral" is transferred to the exchange, clearinghouse, or intermediate broker. SFA Rule 4-63.
When the collateral must be liquidated to satisfy margin requirements, the intermediate broker
must transfer any excess to the client bank account identified by the firm in its notice to the
broker. See SFA Rule 4-63(b)(ii). An exchange or clearinghouse, however, is entitled to treat
the excess in accordance with its own rules. See SFA Rule 4-63(b)(iii).
57. See SFA Rule 4-64(a).
58. SFA Rule 4-64(b). Nothing in the SFA Rules provides that a firm has a duty to make up
the shortfall.
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A United Kingdom firm dealing with United States customers
typically does so through the exemption provided under CFTC Rule
§ 30.10. 59 In 1989, the CFTC granted an exemption under Rule
§ 30.10 to firms designated by the United Kingdom's Association of
Futures Brokers and Dealers ("AFBD"), 60 the predecessor to the
SFA.61 Prior to issuing this "Part 30 Exemption," the CFTC had to
evaluate the AFBD and its "regulating program" to determine
whether these provided "substituted compliance," for example,
whether the SRO's rules and the regulatory scheme under which it
operated met the requirements of Rule § 30.10 and Appendix A to
the Part 30 Rules. Those requirements included, among other things,
whether United Kingdom law, Securities and Investments Board
("SIB") regulations and AFBD rules provided sufficient "protection
of customer funds from misapplication. '62 United Kingdom firms in-
dividually exempted under Part 30 are permitted to forgo registration
with the CFTC, the separate account requirements under Rule § 30.7,
and the CFTC financial regulations under 17 C.F.R. Part 1.63
In addition, United Kingdom firms granted Part 30 relief must
abide by the SFA's Client Money Rules 64 and agree
to refuse customers resident in the United States the option of not
segregating funds notwithstanding relevant provisions of the United
Kingdom regulatory system and otherwise consent to provide all
customers resident in the United States no less stringent regulatory
protection than United Kingdom customers under all relevant pro-
visions of United Kingdom law.65
Thus, a United States customer cannot "opt out" of the Client Money
Rules.66
59. 17 C.F.R. § 30.10 (1996).
60. See Foreign Futures and Option Transactions, CFTC Order, 54 Fed. Reg. 21,604 (1989);
see also Limited Marketing Activities From a United States Location, CFTC Order, 57 Fed. Reg.
49,644, 49,645 (1992).
61. AFBD merged with The Securities Association to form the SFA. See SFA Rules, App.
36 2.
62. Foreign Futures and Option Transactions, CFTC Order, 54 Fed. Reg. at 21,604; see also
Interpretative Statement With Respect to the Commission's Exemptive Authority Under § 30.10
of Its Rules, 17 C.F.R. pt. 30, App. A.
63. See Foreign Futures and Option Transactions, CFTC Order, 54 Fed. Reg. at 21,605.
64. Under SFA Rule 4-72, a United States customer's money must be "treat[ed] as client
money ... which is held or received in respect of transactions on non U.S. exchanges."
65. Foreign Futures and Option Transactions, CFTC Order, 54 Fed. Reg. at 21,606.
66. In addition to the Part 30 Exemption for SFA, SFA Rule 4-72 prohibits a United States
resident firm from opting out of the client money rules.
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II. SOURCES OF SYSTEMIC RISK
As illustrated by the Barings collapse, notwithstanding the de-
tailed rules and procedures in the United States and the United King-
dom governing the treatment of customer property used to trade
futures and options contracts, the safety of such property cannot be
presumed. Customer property may be invaded at several points
through, for example, fraud or negligence (whether such fraud or neg-
ligence was that of the customer's own broker or of a correspondent
broker selected by the customer's broker), or a correspondent bro-
ker's default. This Section will identify and discuss sources of systemic
risk and regulatory efforts to control such risk. This section also will
identify one source of risk not directly addressed by regulation-the
risk of the default of a third party depository of customer margin.
A. Negligence and Fraud
The customer's broker or a correspondent broker utilized by the
customer's broker may invade customer property through its own neg-
ligence or fraud. For violations of the Act's segregation requirements,
§ 6C67 authorizes the CFTC to institute proceedings against the FCM.
A decision in favor of the CFTC may result in a civil penalty of not
more than one hundred thousand dollars or triple the FCM's mone-
tary gain, and an order to cease and desist from the prohibited activ-
ity. In addition, such decision may result in the suspension or
revocation of the FCM's registration, and the denial of the FCM's
trading privileges on any contract market.68 Furthermore, § 9(a)(1) 69
authorizes criminal prosecutions for flagrant violations of the Act's
segregation requirements. FCMs that "embezzle, steal, purloin, or
with criminal intent convert" customer property may be found guilty
of a felony punishable by a fine of not more than one million dollars
(or five hundred thousand dollars in the case of an individual) or im-
prisonment of not more than five years.70
An example of fraudulent conduct occurred in In re Incomco,
Inc.71 In Incomco, among other things, the FCM transferred funds
from a customer account to its own general account at a time when
the FCM knew it held insufficient funds to cover its customers' trading
67. 7 U.S.C. § 13a-1 (1994).
68. See id.
69. See id. § 13(a).
70. Id.
71. [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 21,483 (Sept. 20, 1982).
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activities.72 For this and other violations, the administrative law judge
invoked the CFTC's maximum sanction by revoking Incomco's regis-
trations as an FCM commodity trading advisor and commodity pool
operator; prohibiting Incomco from trading on or subject to any con-
tract market; requiring all contract markets to refuse Incomco all trad-
ing privileges; and requiring Incomco to cease and desist from
violating the Act and regulations.73
B. Default of a United States FCM
Another risk to customer property arises in the potential default
of an FCM carrying such property. The CFTC's Part 190 regulations
dealing with bankruptcy and the Bankruptcy Code (the "Code") 74
contain specific procedures designed to protect customer property in
the event of an FCM's bankruptcy. Nevertheless, as illustrated by the
default of Volume Investors Corporation, these procedures may not
thoroughly shield customers from all losses.75
Like the CFTC's segregation requirements, the rules governing
the treatment of customer property following an FCM's bankruptcy
strive to protect such property while insulating the market from a de-
fault-induced chain reaction.76 Article IV of Chapter 7 of the Code77
defines "customer property" to include "other property of the [FCM]
that any applicable law, rule or regulation requires to be set aside or
held for the benefit of a customer. ' 78 If the FCM has undersegregated
72. See id. at 26,244-445.
73. See id. at 26,249.
74. 17 C.F.R. pt. 190 (1996); 11 U.S.C. §§ 761-766.
75. See Andrea M. Corcoran & Susan C. Ervin, Maintenance of Market Strategies in Futures
Broker Insolvencies: Futures Position Transfers from Troubled Firms, 44 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
849 (1987); Andrea M. Corcoran, Risk-Avoidance Strategies for Large Market Participants, SEC.
& COMMODMEs REG., Aug. 27, 1986, at 173; William F. Tueting & Christopher Q. King, Funds
Protections: An Overview of What Happens When a Commodity Broker Becomes Insolvent, 7 J.
FUTURES MARKETS 93 (1987). For a detailed discussion of the factual circumstances surround-
ing the Volume case, see Perry L. Taylor, Jr. & David J. Gelfand, The Default of a Clearing
Member: Revisiting the Financial Collapse of Volume Investors Corporation, 8TH ANN. COM-
MoDrr[Es L. INST. (1985).
76. The default of one FCM may potentially tie up funds required by other FCMs to meet
their own obligations to other customers, FCMs or the clearinghouse. The inability of solvent
FCMs to access their funds in a timely manner may cause additional defaults which could further
jeopardize customer funds and the market as a whole. See Bankruptcy Act Revision: Hearings
on H.R. 31 and H.R. 32 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 2377, 2393-95 (1976) (statement of William T. Bagley, CFTC
Chairman, explaining the difference between "gross" and "net" margin systems and their effect
on segregation requirements), reprinted in 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY $ 761.15 (Lawrence P.
King ed., 15th ed. 1995).
77. 11 U.S.C. §§ 761-766.
78. 11 U.S.C. § 761(10).
1996]
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
or improperly commingled funds in its customer account, the expan-
sive definition of customer property allows the inclusion of other as-
sets belonging to the FCM to the extent necessary to restore customer
margin to required levels. The CFTC's definition of customer prop-
erty is consistent with the Code's definition and includes "cash, securi-
ties or other property of the [FCM's] estate, including the [FCM's]
trading or operating accounts and commodities of the [FCM] held in
inventory," to the extent that available segregated amounts are "insuf-
ficient to satisfy in full all claims of public customers. '79 The Code
and regulations assure that difficulties in tracing customer property
will not unfairly disadvantage customers to the benefit of the default-
ing FCM's general creditors.80 Once the extent of the FCM's property
available for distribution to customers is established, § 766(h) of the
Code specifies the formula for distributing such property. Under this
section, the bankruptcy trustee is required to distribute customer
property "ratably to customers on the basis and to the extent of such
customers' allowed net equity claims, and in priority to all other
claims, except claims . . . attributable to the administration of cus-
tomer property."81
From the customer's perspective, the Code and CFTC regulations
only provide a partial solution. Customers have interests both in their
property deposited with their FCM and in the trading positions collat-
eralized by such property. When the customer trades for hedging, as
opposed to speculative purposes, the customer bears the additional
risk associated with being unable to adjust the hedge position in the
futures market when the cash position changes. Hence, the Code and
regulations contain special provisions authorizing the trustee to trans-
79. 17 C.F.R. § 190.08(a)(1)(ii)(J).
80. See Corcoran & Ervin, supra note 75, at 875.
81. 11 U.S.C. § 766(h). Section 190.07 of the CFTC's regulations specifies the steps in cal-
culating a customer's pro rata share of available customer property. 17 C.F.R. § 190.07. Certain
contracts on foreign financial instruments or indices traded on United States exchanges are
priced and settled in the currency of the underlying instrument or index in order to enhance the
effectiveness of the contracts for hedging purposes. Subject to certain conditions, FCMs may
carry the segregated funds of domestic customers in certain foreign depositories. Among these
conditions is the requirement that FCMs, before placing a customer's funds overseas, obtain
from the customer a subordination agreement. The subordination agreement effectively creates
a "hierarchy" of segregated funds accounts by authorizing
the subordination of a customer's claims attributable to funds held offshore in a partic-
ular foreign currency to the claims of customers whose funds are held in dollars or
other foreign currencies in the event that the FCM is placed in bankruptcy of receiver-
ship and there are insufficient funds to satisfy all customer claims against those funds.
Financial and Segregation Interpretation No. 12 - Deposit of Customer Funds in Foreign Deposi-
tories, [1988-1990 Transfer Binder] 1 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 7122, at 7139 (Nov. 16, 1988).
Hence, the subordination agreement will preclude the dilution of customer funds held in dollars
or in a foreign currency caused by insufficient funds in another foreign currency. See id.
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fer open trading positions of the failed FCM's customers.82 Effecting
position transfers, however, may be difficult under circumstances
where the FCM possesses insufficient margin to support the positions.
Other FCMs may be unwilling to contribute their own capital to bring
transferred positions up to minimum margin standards. Note, how-
ever, that the CFTC's Part 190 regulations relate to the default of the
customer's FCM, and may not come into play if an FCM is not forced
into default following the default of a depository institution.
C. Default of a United Kingdom Commodity Broker
In the United Kingdom, the insolvency or default 83 of a firm or
correspondent broker obligated under an exchange-traded futures or
option on a futures contract 84 invokes both statutory and exchange or
clearinghouse rules8 5 that supplant certain of the normal insolvency
rules.8 6 Such rules provide for the protection of market participants
and the liquidity of the markets in times of crisis.87 Thus, under the
Companies Act 1989, as is true in some respects under United States
bankruptcy law, the clearinghouse is entitled, after insolvency, to set
off obligations running from the defaulting party to the clearinghouse
82. For example, § 764(b) of the Code "insulates from the trustee's avoidance power trans-
fers of commodity contracts.., made within five days after the order for relief, if the transfer is
approved by the [CFTC] by rule or order, either before or after the transfer." Corcoran &
Ervin, supra note 75, at 878. CFTC regulations require that it be notified no later than the third
business day after the order for relief as to whether a transfer under § 764(b) of the Code will be
made. See 17 C.F.R. § 190.02(a)(2). If such transfer is not disapproved by the CFTC, it may not
be avoided by the trustee. See id. § 190.06(g).
83. Under United Kingdom law, a brokerage firm in financial difficulty may be placed in
liquidation, administration, administrative receivership, or, if an individual, bankruptcy. The
form of proceeding is, for the most part, irrelevant to the application of the special default rules
under the Companies Act, its regulations, and the exchange and clearinghouse rules.
84. The Companies Act uses the term "market contract." See Companies Act, 1989, § 155
(Eng.).
85. Section 156 of the Companies Act incorporates the requirements found in that Act's
Schedule 21 (regarding additional requirements for recognition of an exchange or clearinghouse)
into the FSA. Companies Act, 1989, § 156 (Eng.). Under Schedule 21, an exchange or clearing-
house, in order to be "recognized" under the FSA, must have default rules which provide,
among other things, that a defaulting party's obligations under open positions, or "market con-
tracts," are set off against rights to payment under those market contracts. See id. sched. 21.
Regulations with respect to Part VII of the Companies Act are found in Financial Markets
and Insolvency Regulations 1991, (S.t. 1991 No. 880) (Mar. 27, 1991), reproduced in 2 Fin. Servs.
Rep. (CCH) at 161,583.
86. Provisions for insolvency, receivership, and administration are found in the Insolvency
Act 1986. Part VII of the United Kingdom's Companies Act 1989 alters these provisions and
some rules of equity with respect to "market contracts." See Companies Act, 1989, §§ 154-155
(Eng.).
87. See 1 Fin. Servs. Rep. (CCH) IT 94-100 for comments of the Secretary of State for
Trade and Industry (Lord Young) upon the introduction of Part VII of the Companies Act 1989
("[I]f one member of a market defaults, it is vital to prevent a domino effect which could bring
down other members.").
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against reciprocal obligations regardless of whether one such obliga-
tion was incurred pre-insolvency and the other post-insolvency. This
right of setoff, or netting out, is inconsistent with the equitable princi-
ples developed under United Kingdom insolvency law.88
In addition, the power of a liquidator or trustee in bankruptcy to
repudiate or "disclaim" onerous contracts cannot be exercised when
the contract is a market contract or "a contract effected by the ex-
change or clearinghouse for the purpose of realising property pro-
vided as margin. '89 Nor can the liquidator or trustee avoid a post-
insolvency disposition (i.e., a transfer or sale) of the property under
the default rules of the exchange or clearinghouse when that property
is either the market contract itself or collateral for margin purposes. 90
Pre-insolvency transactions with respect to market contracts, property
"in pursuance of such contract," or margin cannot be voided on
grounds that such transactions might be considered "preferences,"
"transactions at an undervalue," or "transactions defrauding credi-
tors."91 Finally, "market charges" (security interests held by the ex-
change or clearinghouse) on the defaulting party's property survive
the avoiding provisions of the Insolvency Act.92 Thus, the exchange
or clearinghouse can realize on collateral put up by the debtor without
violating Insolvency Act provisions regarding restrictions on the en-
forcement of a security interest and the power of the administrator to
control and dispose of the property.
D. Default of a Depository Institution
An area of systemic risk not directly addressed by regulation is
the failure of a depository institution holding customer funds. For ex-
ample, the customer's broker, correspondent brokers, and clearing or-
88. In British Eagle Int'l Air Lines Ltd. v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 1 W.L.R. 758
(1975), the House of Lords declared post-insolvency setoff unlawful when exercised against a
pre-insolvency obligation because to permit such a setoff would constitute a preference of cer-
tain creditors over others. The case involved a clearinghouse to which several airlines belonged
and which settled the accounts of participating airlines on a monthly basis. Under the rule an-
nounced in British Eagle, were it not for the exceptions provided by the Companies Act, it might
be impossible for a clearinghouse or exchange to net out the positions of defaulting parties. See
Companies Act, 1989, sched. 21; see also The London Clearing House Risk Management Circu-
lar No. 582/95, Default Rule 8 (June 8, 1995).
89. Companies Act, 1989, § 164(1) ("disapplying" §§ 178, 186, 315, and 345 of the Insol-
vency Act 1986).
90. See id. § 164(3) ("disapplying" §§ 127 and 284 of the Insolvency Act 1986).
91. See id. § 165 ("disapplying" §§ 238, 239, 340, and 423 of the Insolvency Act 1986).
92. Section 173 of the Companies Act defines "market charge"; Section 175 provides for the
disapplication of various provisions of the Insolvency Act 1986.
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ganizations all may use banks to deposit customer funds.93 Banks
therefore represent an important source of liquidity to the exchange
mechanism. Nevertheless, customer margin deposits in the United
States receive no special treatment in comparison to any other depos-
its in insolvency proceedings and the relationship created between an
FCM and the bank does not differ from that of any other depositor
(i.e., a debtor-creditor relationship is created). Hence, in any insol-
vency proceeding, a temporary stay on the bank's assets will prevent
depositors from removing funds. Such an action directly impairs the
bank's ability to provide liquidity to the exchanges. A particularly
problematic variant of this scenario arises when the defaulting broker
is affiliated with or, as permitted under some jurisdictions, is a bank.
This situation is illustrated by the Barings collapse. Barings plc,
the Barings Group parent company, conducted its futures trading
business through Barings Securities Limited ("BSL"). BSL main-
tained customer agreements, provided liquidity to its various subsidi-
aries to enable them to engage in futures transactions, and held
deposits of customer funds. BSL operated several subsidiaries, includ-
ing Barings Futures (Singapore) Pte Limited ("BFS"), a clearing
member of SIMEX, and Baring Securities (Japan) Limited ("BSJ"),
which handled trades on several major Japanese futures markets. 94
Both BFS and BSJ traded on their own behalf and on behalf of cus-
tomers, which included individuals, corporations, and other brokers
who themselves were trading for their own and their customers' ac-
counts. For example, a United States person placing a trade on
SIMEX would normally place the order with a United States FCM
who, in turn, would place the order with BFS. After executing the
order, BFS would pass the appropriate instructions to BSL to reflect
the trade on the United States broker's customer omnibus account on
BSL's books.
Like the default of Volume Investors Co., the default of BFS re-
quired exchange clearing organizations to step in and effect position
transfers to other brokers. Initially, positions belonging to BFS cus-
tomers were moved along with the required margin deposits held at
BSL. However, a problem developed when Ernst & Young, the Bar-
ings Group administrator in London, ordered a freeze on all asset
transfers. Citing the holding in Space Investments Ltd. v. Canadian
93. See supra text accompanying note 23.
94. BSJ was a full clearing member of TSE and OSE, and was a trading but nonclearing
member of TIFFE. See BANK OF ENGLAND, supra note 1, at 3.6. BSJ traded contracts on the
OSE, the TSE and the TIFFE.
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Imperial Bank of Commerce Trust Co. ,95 the Barings administrator ar-
gued that client money placed with BSL was an asset of the bank and
therefore subject to the claims of the bank's general creditors.96 In
addition, the administrator argued that the margin and open positions
under BSL's name but held for customers were assets of the bank and
attempted to force the turnover of those assets by intermediary bro-
kers, investment exchanges, and their clearinghouses. 97
With BSL unable to supply the necessary liquidity to support po-
sition transfers, customers looked to their brokers to supply the neces-
sary funds out of their own capital. Brokers, in turn, claimed that
doing so would seriously cripple, if not destroy, their ability to con-
tinue doing business. The inability of such brokers to continue busi-
ness would have threatened additional defaults on other exchanges
and affected customers with no relation either to Barings or the ex-
change clearing organizations holding Barings' positions. 98
95. 3 All E.R. 75 (P.C. 1986) (appeal taken from Bah.).
96. See Bettelheim, supra note 6, at 18.
97. See id.; see also Ginger Szala et al., Barings Abyss, FuTuREs, May 1995, at 68-69 (Ernst
& Young, the Barings administrator, instructed SIMEX. OSE, and TIFFE to hold all money
attributed to Barings); Sheila C. Bair, Lessons from the Barings Collapse, 64 FORDHAM L. REV.
1, 7-8 (1995).
The SIB's Client Money Regulations, then in force, may have been a source of the problem
for they did not yet apply to situations in which an authorized person, also a bank, holds client
money in an account with itself. Thus, client money held at Barings by BSL for its customers
was, for a time after the failure, considered by the administrator to be simply the bank's assets.
See The Financial Services (Client Money) Regulations 1991, SIB Rules ch. VI, reproduced in 2
Fin. Servs. Rep. (CCH) at 185,761, 185,744 ("Where a bank which is authorized under the [Fi-
nancial Services] Act in respect of its investment business holds money on behalf of its clients, it
does so as the clients' banker and such money is not subject to the [Client Money] Regula-
tions."); Szala et al., supra, at 74 ("'The client money is safe from the securities firm that's
handling it, but it is not safe from failure of the bank in which the securities firm deposited the
money."') (quoting Richard Farrant, an SFA officer). This result has not changed under the new
SFA Client Money Rules. When a bank acts as broker, the Client Money Rules do not apply.
See SFA Rule 4-50(2)(b).
98. See Bettelheim, supra note 6, at 19. Even if a United Kingdom bank administrator
properly recognized a client bank account as a deposit, the deposit insurance available to the
customer would be a much smaller sum than is available in the United States under the Federal
Deposit Insurance Act. The United Kingdom's Banking Act 1987 provides, at a maximum, for £
15,000. Section 58(1) of the Banking Act provides insurance for "three-quarters" of the amount
of the "protected deposit." However, § 60 limits that deposit amount to £ 20,000. See Deposit
Protection Board v. Dalia, 1 All E.R. 539, 543 (C.A. 1994); 3(1) HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND
%1 115-117 (4th ed. 1989).
The Banking Act does provide a type of "pass-through" deposit insurance. Thus, under
§ 61(7) each client in a client bank account would be entitled to up to £ 15,000 in insurance
determined by the client's pro rata share of the account. However, a client's share of deposit
insurance will be reduced by whatever amount he would be entitled to as an investor under the
FSA. See Banking Act, 1987, § 58(3) (Eng.).
The maximum amount that any one investor can recover under the "Investor Compensation
Scheme" is £ 48,000, but the fund is further limited to expending £ 100 million in any one year.
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The issue of a broker's responsibility for providing additional li-
quidity from its own capital was never resolved in the Barings crisis
due to the intervention of ING. But for ING's purchase of most of
Barings' assets and guarantee of most of its obligations, the chances of
resolving the default without major market consequences would have
decreased. Arguments for and against the imposition of liability on
FCMs for customer losses caused by the default of another depository
institution could draw support from several sources, including the
common law treatment of the relationship between brokers and their
customers, the legislative history of the segregation provisions of the
Act, and subsequent judicial and administrative opinions. The next
Section will present and analyze these sources in detail as well as as-
sess efforts by customers and FCMs to better define the scope of lia-
bility for third-party defaults via contract.
III. THE NATURE OF THE BROKER-CUSTOMER RELATIONSHIP
The Barings collapse raised the issue of whether and, if so, to
what extent brokers are responsible to their customers for the loss of
customer property caused by the default of a depository institution
selected by the customer's broker. While the CFTC's bankruptcy reg-
ulations affirmatively obligate an insolvent FCM to apply its own as-
sets to make up any shortfall in funds segregated on behalf of
customers, no United States regulatory provision directly addresses a
solvent FCM's responsibility to return such margin, despite the threat
to exchange liquidity posed by the default of a major depository insti-
tution of customer margin. In the absence of clear regulatory gui-
dance on this issue, competing arguments likely will derive from
several fundamental sources, including the nature of the relationship
between customers and their brokers and the legislative history of rel-
evant portions of the Act.
Part A of this section will review the common law treatment of
the relationship between brokers and their customers. Part B will ex-
amine the legislative history of segregation requirements of § 4d(2) of
the Act, as well as judicial and administrative interpretations of the
relevant legislative history. Part C will assess the duties owed by bro-
kers to their customers as a result of this relationship. Part D will
evaluate efforts by the broker to modify the scope of such duties via
the inclusion of exculpatory clauses in their customer account agree-
ments. Finally, Part E will examine the potential interrelationship be-
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tween exculpatory clauses and the CFTC's minimum financial
requirements.
A. The Common Law Treatment of Brokers
The common law generally characterized the relationship be-
tween brokers and their customers as fiduciary in nature.99 As fiduci-
aries, brokers owe to their customers certain duties inherent in their
relationship. Among these duties are the duty to exercise the requi-
site level of care and skill,100 the duty to keep and render accounts, 10'
the duty to act within the scope of authority, 10 2 and the duty to segre-
gate property belonging to the principal from other property belong-
ing to the agent or under its control. 103
Many of these same concepts are reflected in the Act and the
regulations.' °4 For example, discussed above, 105 the Act contains de-
tailed provisions requiring the segregation of customer property, 0 6 in-
cluding the requirement that the deposit account name clearly identify
the funds as belonging to the customers of the depositing FCM.10 7
99. The leading case in this area held that an agency relationship existed between a cus-
tomer and a broker executing orders on such customer's behalf. Markham v. Jaudon, 41 N.Y.
235, 244-45 (1869). The court ruled that the relationship was governed by fiduciary, in addition
to contractual, principles. See id. The Restatement of Agency defines a fiduciary relationship as
one wherein one of the parties acts "primarily for the benefit of another in matters connected
with [the subject matter of the agency]." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 13 cmt. a
(1958). Accord In re Rosenbaum Grain Corp., 103 F.2d 656, 660 (7th Cir. 1939) ("On the stock
and commodity exchanges, the broker and his customer stand to each other as principal and
agent. This relation, contemplating as it does the holding by the broker of the customer's money
and other property, is primarily fiduciary in nature.").
100. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 379(1) (1958).
101. See id. § 382.
102. See id. § 383.
103. See id. § 398 ("[A]n agent receiving or holding things on behalf of the principal is sub-
ject to a duty to the principal not to receive or deal with them so that they will appear to be his
own, and not so to mingle them with his own things as to destroy their identity."); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 179 (1959) ("The trustee is under a duty to the benefici-
ary to keep the trust property separate from his individual property, and, so far as it is reason-
able that he should do so, to keep it separate from other property not subject to the trust, and to
see that the property is designated as property of the trust.").
104. For an extensive treatment of the fiduciary duties arising under the Commodity Futures
Act, see Jerry W. Markham, Fiduciary Duties Under the Commodity Exchange Act, 68 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 199 (1992).
105. See supra text accompanying note 21.
106. See 7 U.S.C. § 4d(2) (1994); 17 C.F.R. §§ 1.20(a), 1.22 (1996). See also Hibberd v. Fur-
long, 257 N.W. 737, 738-39 (Mich. 1934) (holding agent not liable for loss of principal's funds
upon failure of depository where course of dealing and necessity of situation justified deposit of
principal's money in the agent's own name).
107. "[T]rust property should be ordinarily so earmarked as to indicate not only that it is
trust property but that it is property of the particular trust upon which it is held." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 179 cmt. d (1959). An FCM also must obtain from the depository a
written acknowledgment that the funds belong to the FCM's customers. See 17 C.F.R. § 1.20(a).
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This requirement prevents the bank from later claiming a right of off-
set-an arguable position if the transaction were for the FCM's own
account.10 8 Like common law fiduciaries, FCMs are under a duty to
keep and render accurate accounts.109 Aside from the similarities be-
tween duties placed on common law fiduciaries and those placed on
FCMs by the Act and regulations promulgated thereunder, customers
and FCMs alike may support their positions based on the legislative
history of the segregation provisions of the Act.
B. The Legislative History of Section 4d(2)
Safeguards covering the treatment of customer funds were first
introduced in the Commodity Exchange Act of 1936.110 The Act's
predecessor, the Grain Futures Act,' did not require commodity
brokers to segregate their own funds from those belonging to individ-
ual customers. The practice of commingling funds led to two types of
abuse. First, some commodity brokers used customer funds to extend
credit to certain favored customers, typically large speculators. These
speculators often took market positions opposite that of smaller cus-
tomers and, because of their ability to control large positions, were
able to favorably influence prices. In effect, smaller customers were
financing large speculators who were allegedly manipulating the mar-
ket against them.112
A fiduciary that fails to properly segregate its customer's assets from its own before deposit-
ing those assets in a depository risks being treated as a debtor of the beneficiary. See, e.g, Wil-
liams v. Lowe, 113 N.E. 471, 473 (Ind. App. 1916) (holding that an agent depositing his
principal's money in a bank can escape the risk of its loss by the failure of the bank "only by
making the deposit in his principal's name, or by so distinguishing it on the books of the bank as
to indicate in some way that it is the principal's money").
108. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 398 cmt. a (1958). Moreover, "it is ordina-
rily not sufficient that the trustee should take title to the property in the name of the trustee 'as
trustee' without indicating the particular trust upon which it is held. It should be taken in the
name of the trustee as . . . 'trustee for' certain beneficiaries." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRUSTS § 179 cmt. d (1959). This requirement parallels the account titling regulations in 17
C.F.R. § 1.20(a).
109. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 172 (1959). The Act also imposes certain
accounting and recordkeeping requirements on FCMs with respect to deposits of customer
funds. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 1.33.
110. Pub. L. No. 675, 49 Stat. 1491 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-25) (1936).
111. From 1922 to 1935, the nation's grain markets were regulated by the Grain Futures Act,
42 Stat. 998, enacted Sept. 21, 1922.
112. See, e.g., 80 CONG. REC. 6162 (1936) (Remarks of Sen. Pope citing failures of the E.F.
Carlston Co. and Rosenbaum Grain Co., commission merchants, resulting from commingling of
customer and proprietary funds); 80 CONG. REC. 7856 (1936) (Remarks of Sen. Pope); 80 CONG.
REC. 7911-12 (1936) (Remarks of Sen. Norris); 80 CONG. REC. 7858 (1936) (Remarks of Sen.
Murray citing common practice of commission merchants to use excess margin deposits contrib-
uted by small speculators to finance trading of large speculators).
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A second, related problem involved commodity brokers' use of
customer funds for proprietary trading purposes. If a broker using
customer property in such a manner subsequently defaulted on its
margin obligations, the margin amount deposited with the clearing or-
ganization would be paid to those clearing members holding opposite
positions in the market, not to the defaulted broker's customers who
originally supplied the funds. 113 As a result, customers bore the risk
of the broker's proprietary activities.
To curb these and other perceived abuses in the grain futures
markets, Congress made several efforts to reform the Grain Futures
Act. H.R. 7608, introduced on January 13, 1932, was the first bill to
contain specific language requiring commodity brokers to segregate
and separately account for customer funds.11 4 Bills introduced in sub-
sequent legislative sessions further defined the relationship, requiring
commodity brokers to "treat and deal with as trust funds" all customer
property used to margin futures positions.11 5 Members of the com-
modities industry strongly objected to the apparent creation of a stat-
utory trust between commodity brokers and their customers." 6 This
sentiment was echoed by several members of Congress who, in the
minority report to one of the bills containing "trust funds" language,
stated:
The use of a technical legal phrase such as "trust funds", connoting
as it does a wealth of legal literature and conflicting court decisions,
is dangerous until careful study is made of the effect of the phrase
113. During the early 1930s, two defaults focused Congressional attention on the problems
associated with using customer funds to support a broker's own trading activities. The first, the
Rosenbaum Grain Elevator Company, defaulted while holding customer margins of approxi-
mately $750,000. See 80 CONG. REC. 6162 (1936) (Remarks of Sen. Pope). The second major
default occurred in 1935 and involved the E.F. Carlston Company of Minneapolis. Customers of
E.F. Carlston Company reportedly were offered a settlement of thirty cents on the dollar in
satisfaction of their claims. See id.
114. H.R. 7608, 72d Cong. § 4C (1932):
It shall be unlawful for any person to engage in soliciting or accepting orders ... involv-
ing contracts of sale or to sell grain for future delivery... unless such person ... shall
keep separate and shall not commingle with his own any of the money, securities, or
property received by such person to margin or guarantee the trades or contracts of the
customers of such person ....
115. H.R. 9623, 73d Cong. § 4d (1934) (Emphasis added). See, e.g., S. 3180, 73d Cong. § 4d
(1934); H.R. 9471, 73d Cong. § 4 (1934).
116. Arthur F. Lindley, President of the Board of Trade Clearing Corporation, stated in a
hearing on H.R. 8829: "[A] system devised to extend legal trust treatment to customers' margin
deposits could not operate with the required flexible latitude and would be most cumbersome
and difficult to operate if indeed not impossible." Regulation of Grain Exchanges: Hearings on
H.R. 8829 Before the House Comm. on Agric., 73d Cong. 149 (1934). Accord H.R. REP. No. 73-
1637, at 40-41 (1934) (rejecting implication of common law trust in § 4d).
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on the complicated machinery of the market and auxiliary institu-
tions such as clearing houses and banks. 117
The bills submitted in subsequent legislative sessions, including H.R.
6772 (the bill that ultimately became the Commodity Exchange Act),
dropped the specific language referring to customer funds as "trust
funds." Nevertheless, in several instances during the floor debates,
members of Congress indicated their perception that H.R. 6772 did in
fact create a trust relationship between the commodity broker and its
client. 118
Though not expressly making FCMs trustees of their customers,
the view that the regulatory system enacted by Congress and by the
CFTC nevertheless requires FCMs to fulfill certain fiduciary duties
finds support in the few court decisions that have analyzed the legisla-
tive history in this area. For example, in In re Lincolnwood Commod-
ities, Inc.,a19 an administrative law judge expressed in dicta his view
that the legislative history of § 4d(2) created a trust relationship be-
tween the FCM and its customer, stating that "[i]n 1936, Congress
wanted customer funds to be viewed as 'trust funds,' and recognized
the danger that persons having close relationships with an FCM might
enjoy economic benefits from the relationship at the expense of other
customers."' 120 The view in Lincolnwood is consistent with Interpreta-
tive Letter No. 79-1 in which the CFTC's Office of General Counsel,
in discussing the responsibilities of banks as depositories of customer
segregated funds, stated that
[s]ection 4d(2) ... essentially requires that futures commission
merchants treat as belonging to their customers all money, securi-
ties and property received to margin, guarantee or secure custom-
ers' trades or contracts or accruing to customers as a result of such
trades or contracts - in effect, establishing the futures commission
merchant as a trustee of the customers' property.'2'
Courts have disputed the characterization of FCMs as trustees in
allowing FCMs to retain interest earned on deposits of customer
funds. At common law, trustees were precluded from retaining inter-
117. H.R. REP. No. 73-1522, pt. 2, at 23 (1934).
118. See 80 CONG. REC. 7858 (1936) (statement of Sen. Murray); 80 CONG. REc. 7911 (1936)
(statement of Sen. Norris); see also Comment, The Commodity Exchange Act of 1936, 85 U. PA.
L. REV. 614, 618 (1937).
119. [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] 2 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 21,986 (Jan. 31, 1984).
120. Id. at 28,232 (citation omitted).
121. CFTC Office of General Counsel, Interpretative Letter No. 79-1, [1977-1980 Transfer
Binder] 2 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 20,835, at 23,416 (May 29, 1979) (emphasis added).
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est or other accretions earned on trust property for their own use.122
The CFTC's regulations, however, permit FCMs to retain the interest
earned on deposits of customer funds. 123 In affirming an FCM's right
to retain the interest earned on customer property, the court in Mar-
chese v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc. ,124 interpreted the deletion of
the reference to 'trust funds' in the final bill as an indication that
"Congress specifically rejected the formation of a 'trust' relation-
ship." 125 Regardless of whether the legislative history of § 4d(2) may
or may not be interpreted to incorporate the fiduciary duties imposed
on common law brokers, it is clear that the Act and regulations
promulgated thereunder nevertheless require FCMs to undertake cer-
tain duties that are similar to those expected of fiduciaries under com-
mon law.
C. The Duties Owed to Customers by FCMs
While neither the Act nor the regulations specify the standard of
care applicable to FCMs in conducting activities on behalf of their
customers, common law fiduciaries were subject to a general duty of
skill and care. Specifically, a common law fiduciary must "use reason-
able care in selecting the bank, and properly ...earmark the de-
posit. ' ' 126 The care and skill required is that "which is standard in the
locality for the kind of work which [the agent] is employed to per-
form."'1 27 In the context of the FCM-customer relationship, an inte-
gral aspect of this standard of care is manifested in the FCM's
selection of depository institutions for customer funds.
While the CFTC has never opined on the requisite level of care in
selecting depository institutions, the Commodity Exchange Authority
122. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 388 (1958) ("[Aln agent who makes a profit
in connection with transactions conducted by him.., is under a duty to give such profit to the
principal.").
123. See 17 C.F.R. § 1.29 (1996) ("The investment of customer funds in obligations described
in § 1.25 shall not prevent the futures commission merchant or clearing organization so investing
such funds from receiving and retaining as its own any increment or interest resulting
therefrom.").
124. 644 F. Supp. 1381, 1389 n.22 (C.D. Cal. 1986), afT d, 822 F.2d 876 (9th Cir. 1987).
125. Marchese, 822 F.2d at 878 ("The legislative history of the Act makes it clear that section
4d establishes a specific statutory trust, as opposed to a common law trust, and this fact has long
been recognized."); Accord Craig v. Refco, Inc., 816 F.2d 347 (7th Cir. 1987); Crabtree Inv., Inc.
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 577 F. Supp. 1466 (M.D. La.), affd, 738 F.2d 434
(5th Cir. 1984).
126. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 180 (1959).
127. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 379(1) (1958). An agent "represents that he
has at least the skill and undertakes to exercise the care which is standard for that kind of em-
ployment in the community. A business agent represents that he understands the usages of the
business and undertakes to conduct transactions in accordance with them . I..." Id  at cmt. c.
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("CEA"), the CFTC's predecessor agency, stated in an internal
memorandum:
If a futures commission merchant or a clearing association deposits
regulated commodity customers' funds in a bank and the bank is
later closed and unable to repay the funds the liability of the futures
commission merchant or clearing association would depend on the
manner in which the account was handled. It would not be liable if
it had used due care in selecting the bank, had not otherwise
breached its fiduciary responsibilities toward the customers, and
had fully complied with the requirements of the Commodity Ex-
change Act and the regulations thereunder relating to the handling
of customers' funds. If two banks were available in a particular city
only one of which was a member of FDIC and the futures commis-
sion merchant or clearing association without a compelling reason
elected to use the nonmember bank, we would contend that it had
not used due care in its selection.128
At a minimum, then, an FCM should not deposit or leave on deposit
customer funds in a depository which it knows or should know to be
insolvent or likely to become So. 12 9 The prospective depository also
should be an approved, regulated entity. Moreover, an FCM might
prudently consider undertaking an analysis of the creditworthiness of
the depository to assess its viability. Such analysis should occur
before using a depository for the first time and periodically thereaf-
ter.130 The extent of this analysis is unclear, but might include some
128. Commodity Exchange Authority Administrative Determination No. 230 (Liability of
Futures Commission Merchants and Clearing Associations) (Nov. 23, 1971). While instructive as
to the CEA's view on FCM responsibility, the weight accorded such determinations is questiona-
ble. For example, in Stoller v. CFTC, 834 F.2d 262, 265 (2d Cir. 1987), the court disregarded an
Administrative Determination on the grounds that it did "not consider these documents to be
sufficient to apprise the public at large of the rule interpretation." The court further justified its
position by pointing to the fact that the CEA pronouncement apparently had not been enforced
as the proscribed conduct (wash sales) remained commonplace. See id. Unlike the determina-
tion in Stoler, however, the CFTC has never been in a position to adjudicate the question of an
FCM's negligence in selecting a depository and no industry standard defining the requisite level
of conduct apparently exists.
129. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 180 cmt. b (1959); United States v. Howard,
58 S. Ct. 309 (1938).
130. See, e.g., Zimmerman v. Coblentz, 185 A. 342, 346 (Md. 1936), noted in 15 Cm.-KENT L.
REV. 74 (1936). In Zimmerman, Coblentz, a bank president also functioning as a co-trustee was
held to have violated his fiduciary duties in permitting funds belonging to the trust to be depos-
ited with his bank after it should have been apparent to the trustee that his bank was in financial
difficulty in that it lacked sufficient assets to support the trust deposit. Zimmerman, 185 A. at
349-50. The other trustee, Fulton, was not found liable. As the president of a bank purchased by
Coblentz's bank, the court reasoned that Fulton possessed neither authority over the trust oper-
ations of the new entity nor, based on publicly-available state-tested and approved statements
containing financial information about the new entity, information that would lead a prudent
investor to question the safety of the institution. See id. at 346. In Fulton's case, "[i]t could not
be required that he examine the bank for himself, or look for better protection in private infor-
mation and assurances from trust company officials." Id.
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review of publicly available information regarding the depository's fi-
nancial condition and of credit ratings by national rating agencies.
This conclusion is consistent with the recommendations published
by the Futures Industry Association (the "FIA Recommendations")
following the Barings collapse. 131 The FIA Recommendations suggest
that brokers "should consider and monitor on an ongoing basis the
depositories utilized for customer property."'1 32 Included among the
factors to be considered are "the financial condition of the deposito-
ries, including their credit standing, and the nature of their
operations."1 33
This conclusion also is consistent with the obligations placed on
brokers in the United Kingdom. Under United Kingdom law, the se-
lection of an "approved bank" for client funds places a "duty of care"
running from the firm to its customer requiring the firm to "under-
take[ ] ... appropriate and continuing risk assessment" with regard to
the bank selected. In order to conduct proper risk assessment, the
firm is expected to examine, at the very least,
(a) the capital of the bank; (b) the client money deposit as a propor-
tion of the bank's capital and deposits; (c) the credit rating of the
bank (if available); and (d) to the extent that the information is
available, the level of risk in the investment and loan activities un-
dertaken by the bank and its affiliated companies.' 34
When the bank and the broker are affiliated, 135 the United Kingdom
rules require that the broker not consider the affiliated bank any more
favorably than an unaffiliated one and impose a continuing duty to
periodically monitor and assess risk. In addition, the broker must dis-
close the affiliation to the customer in writing. If the customer ob-
jects, the broker can either return the money to the customer or
deposit the money in a designated client bank account with another
approved bank. 136 However, when the bank is itself the broker, the
Client Money Rules do not apply. 37
131. See Futures Industry Association Global Task Force on Financial Integrity, Financial
Integrity Recommendations for Futures and Options Markets and Market Participants (June
1995).
132. Id. % 16.
133. Id. 9J 15-17.
134. SFA Rule 4-53 and Guidance to that rule. In SFA Board Notice 297, sched. 1, % 9 (Dec.
20, 1995), the SFA announced that it "intends to develop a form of standard client money man-
agement policy which firms will be expected to implement."
135. See SFA Rule 4-53(2). A firm is presumed to be "in the same group" as the bank if the
bank owns twenty percent or more of the firm. See FSA, 1986, sched. 1, $ 30, published in 2 Fin.
Servs. Rep. (CCH) at 102,574.
136. See SFA Rule 4-53(2)-(3).
137. See SFA Rule 4-50(2)(b).
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A similar set of considerations applies to the selection of corre-
spondent brokers for the deposit of customer property. The FIA
Recommendations also enumerate guidelines to assist in the evalua-
tion of correspondent brokers. An analysis based on these guidelines
ought to be considered by FCMs in their evaluation of correspondent
brokers, especially where the FCM's relationship with such entity may
be at less than arm's length.
The primary considerations recommended by the FIA include the
correspondent broker's credit standing, capital adequacy, and overall
financial condition, as well as the clearing organizations and/or ex-
changes, if any, of which it is a member. Another primary factor to
consider involves whether the correspondent broker is also part of a
bank, securities broker, or insurance company. 138 The FIA suggests
an evaluation of the correspondent broker's management experience
and capabilities, its margin policies and customer credit procedures, its
operational capacity, risk management systems and disaster recovery
procedures, and whether or not it engages in proprietary trading. 139
Included among the factors to consider in evaluating a correspondent
broker is the risk that the correspondent broker may default as a re-
sult of the following:
(1) the trading activities of the correspondent broker or its
affiliates;
(2) the trading activities of other customers of the correspondent
broker;
(3) the procedures used by the correspondent broker in establish-
ing customer accounts and in the monitoring and management of
credit and other risks arising from its carrying of such accounts; and
(4) the default of a clearing broker or depository utilized by the
correspondent broker. 140
On the basis of this evaluation, certain procedures may be imple-
mented to protect against the risk of executing and/or clearing trans-
actions through certain correspondent brokers. 41  The FIA
Recommendations suggest that users of correspondent brokers "may
wish to consider obtaining from the correspondent broker a form of
138. Futures Industry Association Global Task Force on Financial Integrity, supra note 131,
j 29.
139. See id.
140. See id. 28.
141. See id. 29.
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credit enhancement, such as an affiliate guarantee or the guarantee
(or letter of credit) of a third party."'1 42
D. Exculpatory Clauses in Customer Agreements
To clarify the scope of their responsibilities to customers, many
FCMs have drafted into their customer agreements exculpatory
clauses relieving the FCM from responsibility for customer losses due
to the misconduct of third parties beyond the FCM's control. For ex-
ample, a typical clause might read:
FCM is acting solely as Customer's agent in connection with Cus-
tomer's account and neither FCM nor its affiliates shall have any
responsibility or liability to Customer hereunder in connection with
the performance or nonperformance of any contract market,
clearinghouse, clearing firm, or other party of its obligations in re-
spect of any contract or any property of the Customer.
At common law, a fiduciary's duty of care could be modified by the
mutual agreement of the parties, subject to the proviso that a fiduciary
could not exculpate itself from liability for negligence of a gross char-
acter.143 In addition, absent a contrary legislative directive, courts
generally permit the enforcement of exculpatory clauses in customer
agreements. 1'
Customers, however, may challenge the enforceability of such ex-
culpatory provisions based on several decisions denying the enforce-
ability of such clauses under certain circumstances. For example, in
Resolution Trust Corp. v. Krantz,145 the defendants sought to avoid
liability for the allegedly fraudulent conduct of a guaranteed Introduc-
ing Broker ("IB") by invoking an exculpatory clause providing:
142. See id. 1 1. If such credit enhancement devices are used, users or correspondent bro-
kers should ensure their understanding of the terms and scope of such credit enhancements as
well as their legal enforceability.
143. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 222 (1959).
144. See Rothwell Cotton Co. v. Rosenthal & Co., 827 F.2d 246, 250 (7th Cir.), as amended,
835 F.2d 710 (7th Cir. 1987); Wolf v. Ford, 644 A.2d 522, 525 (Md. 1994); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 195 cmt. a (1981) ("[A] party to a contract can ordinarily exempt
himself from liability for harm caused by his failure to observe the standard of reasonable care
imposed by the law of negligence.").
Under certain circumstances, however, public policy concerns preclude the enforcement of
certain exculpatory clauses. For example, a party may not exculpate itself for liability for inten-
tional harm or for more extreme forms of negligence. See Winterstein v. Wilcom, 293 A.2d 821,
824-25 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1972); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 195(1) (1981).
Moreover, the contract containing the exculpatory clause may not be the result of "grossly une-
qual bargaining power." Wolf, 644 A.2d at 526. Finally, exculpatory provisions will not be en-
forced in transactions affecting the public interest. This category includes such public service
obligations as public utilities, common carriers, innkeepers, and public warehousemen. See id.
145. No. 89-C166, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10171 (N.D. Il. July 22, 1991).
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Customer[] acknowledges that [defendant's] performance hereun-
der, as principals, may result from activities of independent agents
or Introducing Broker's [sic] for whose activities [defendant] may
be technically legally liable. Customer agrees to waive any claims
against, and to indemnify, defend, save and hold free and harmless
[defendant] for any activities of its independent agents, Introducing
Brokers or their employees of which [defendant] has no actual prior
knowledge or participation .... 146
The court noted that the section of the Act at issue 147 imposed strict
liability on principals for the misdeeds of agents conducted in further-
ance of the scope of their agency. 148 In addition, the Act specifically
described the legal relationship between IBs and FCMs as one of
agency. 49 Under the circumstances, the court found that the exculpa-
tory clause in the customer agreement shifted "the risk from the FCM,
where Congress delegated the risk, to the customer," where the cus-
tomer is itself the victim of the wrongful acts. Hence, the court found
the clause void and unenforceable "as being against the strong public
policy laid out by Congress.' 150
Myron v. Hauser15' contains another example of an invalid excul-
patory clause. The clause at issue stated that the customer would not
hold the FCM liable for losses incurred as a result of the FCM's trad-
ing recommendations. The court found the clause invalid on the
grounds that the FCM's sales representative failed to explain properly
to the customer the risks and mechanics of trading, or the fact that the
particular strategy recommended could result in the total loss of the
customer's investment. 152 In finding the clause a term of adhesion, 153
the court stated, "[Petitioner] cannot use the customer agreement as a
contractual shield against valid federal regulation and liability for vio-
lation of such regulation, or as an 'advance exoneration of contem-
plated fraudulent conduct." 1 54
146. Id. at *2-*3.
147. See 7 U.S.C. § 4 (1994) ("[T]he act, omission or failure of any official, agent, or other
person acting for [an entity regulated by the CFTC] within the scope of his employment or office
shall be deemed the act, omission, or failure of" the entity itself.").
148. See Resolution Trust Corp., 1991 LEXIS 10171, at *8.
149. See id. at *8-*9. A different outcome was reached in Nyhart v. Anctil, No. 88-C938,
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9995 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 1, 1988), where the relationship involved was less direct
(employee of an IB and an FCM that was the owner of another FCM affiliated with the IB).
150. Resolution Trust Corp., 1991 LEXIS 10171, at *10.
151. 673 F.2d 994 (8th Cir. 1982).
152. See id. at 996.
153. A "standardized contract [term] offered to consumers of... services on essentially 'take
it or leave it' basis without affording consumer realistic opportunity to bargain and under such
conditions that consumer cannot obtain desired ... services except by acquiescing in form con-
tract." Bt~cK's LAW DICTIONARY 38 (5th ed. 1979).
154. Myron, 673 F.2d at 1007 (citations omitted).
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Although courts disfavor exculpatory provisions that expressly
contradict a provision of the Act, certain other exculpatory provisions
generally are enforced. For example, in Rothwell Cotton Co. v. Rosen-
thal & Co.,155 a customer claimed against a clearing member FCM for
the allegedly fraudulent sales practices of another, nonclearing mem-
ber FCM that introduced the account. The court ruled that the excul-
patory clause contained in the clearing member FCM's agreement
with the customer, which relieved itself from all liability not related to
the execution and clearing of contracts, was enforceable. 156 The court
in Nyhart v. Anctil' 57 reached a similar conclusion. In Nyhart, a cus-
tomer sought to recover losses from an employee of an IB, the IB, the
IB's FCM, and another entity (itself an FCM) that wholly-owned the
IB's FCM ("Index Futures"). Index Futures sought to have the com-
plaint dismissed against itself insofar as the customer entered into an
agreement containing an exculpatory clause relieving Index Futures
from liability for customer losses "incurred as a result of other than its
own gross negligence or willful misconduct concerning the execution
of trades for the [customer's] [a]ccount."' 58 The court based its hold-
ing on the conclusion that the provision in the customer agreement
was in plain language and was highlighted in boldface. Moreover, the
court noted that the complaint did not allege that either the IB or the
IB's FCM were agents of Index Futures. According to the court, "[i]n
the absence of an agency relationship, the exculpatory clause merely
limit[ed Index Futures'] liability to conduct for which [it] was respon-
sible: the execution and clearing of trades. 1 59 As a result, the court
held that the exculpatory clause was not inconsistent with the Act. 160
FCMs could therefore argue that a customer agreement provision
exculpating itself from liability for the acts of third parties should be
enforced because it is not contrary to the expressed intent of Con-
gress. Unenforceable exculpatory clauses, like those in Krantz and
Myron, involved attempts by the FCM to avoid liability for acts of
agents or for failing to adequately disclose the risks of a particular
trading strategy, both required by specific provisions of the Act.161
155. 827 F.2d 246 (7th Cir. 1987).
156. See id. at 250.
157. See 1988 LEXIS 9995 at *6.
158. Id. at *5.
159. Id. at *7.
160. See id. at *6.
161. As stated above, the relationship between an FCM and its deposit of customer property
with a correspondent broker or bank depository may be characterized as one of creditor-debtor,
and not one of agency. See supra text accompanying note 107.
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Based on the holding in Nyhart, an FCM could argue that its exculpa-
tory clause does no more than limit its responsibility to its own con-
duct, and as such, should be enforceable.
E. The Interrelationship Between Exculpatory Clauses and Net
Capital Requirements
As discussed above,162 minimum financial requirements exclude
current assets that are "doubtful of collection or realization" from the
calculation of an FCM's assets for net capital purposes.163 In the
event of the default of a depository institution, the operation of these
rules may significantly impair the viability of an FCM that has placed
a portion of its customers' funds with such depository.
To illustrate the operation of the minimum financial require-
ments, consider the following example. FCM XYZ with total capital
of $50 million is required, as a result of its customer's trading activi-
ties, to maintain a minimum adjusted net capital balance equal to $40
million. FCM XYZ therefore has $10 million in excess capital.
Twenty million dollars represents the Secured Amount balance gener-
ated by customers trading on non-United States exchanges through
FCM XYZ. In the ordinary course of its business, FCM XYZ will
reflect this activity on its balance sheet as a liability to its customers of
$20 million and as a $20 million asset in the form of a deposit with a
foreign depository institution. Thus, the overseas deposit has no net
balance sheet effect and the only change to required net capital is the
charge for the deposit (i.e., four percent of $20 million).
The default of a foreign depository institution holding the $20
million Separate Account deposit would, absent the intervention of
another institution to assume the obligations of the foreign deposi-
tory, cause the deposit to be treated as an "asset doubtful of collection
or realization." Hence, FCM XYZ would have to exclude the $20 mil-
lion Separate Account from its assets in calculating adjusted net capi-
tal. The $20 million liability to customers, however, would remain and
FCM XYZ would have to rely on other sources of capital to meet its
minimum financial requirement. Based on the assumption described
above, since FCM XYZ only has $10 million in excess net capital, the
requirement of balancing the $20 million owed to customers with a
corresponding asset would exhaust the FCM XYZ's excess capital and
162. See supra text accompanying notes 38-45.
163. 17 C.F.R. § 1.17(c)(2)(iv) (1995).
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result in its undercapitalization. Absent additional capital infusions
from other sources FCM XYZ would have to cease doing business.
If FCM XYZ were to go into bankruptcy, the distribution of its
assets would be governed by specific CFTC regulations and the Bank-
ruptcy Code. As discussed above, the regulations and Code accord
differing priorities to the various forms in which customer funds may
be held. To the extent that property segregated on behalf of custom-
ers is insufficient to satisfy all claims of customers, the CFTC's regula-
tions affirmatively require a bankrupt FCM to apply its own property.
Thus, FCM XYZ would exhaust its $10 million excess capital reserve
to restore half of the balance deposited by foreign futures account
customers. The remainder would be restored by invading the FCM's
core capital.
No specific provision of the Act or the CFTC's regulations di-
rectly mandates this conclusion where the FCM remains in business
following the default of a depository institution. CFTC Rule § 1.22
has been cited to require an FCM to cover shortfalls in customer ac-
counts out of the FCM's own reserves. 164 Rule § 1.22, however, only
prohibits an FCM from using the funds of one customer to purchase,
margin, or settle the trades of any other customer. 165 This rule is prin-
cipally intended to make certain that funds belonging to solvent cus-
tomers are not used to margin the trades of debtor customers. To
argue that Rule § 1.22 requires an FCM to cover shortfalls in cus-
tomer accounts out of the FCM's own reserves under circumstances
not involving a debtor customer, but instead involving the default of a
depository institution, assumes that the FCM may effectively become
an absolute guarantor of its customers' funds.
Neither Rule § 1.22 nor any other regulatory provision directly
addresses the obligations of an FCM upon the default of a third party
depository institution, nor do the regulations address the status of the
customer's segregated funds in such a circumstance. In the absence of
clear regulatory guidance as to the existence and scope of a solvent
FCM's obligations to its customers following such a default, customers
would argue in favor of imposing an affirmative obligation on such
FCMs based upon the sources previously discussed. Specifically, cus-
tomers would maintain that the FCM is liable based on the common
law's treatment of brokers as fiduciaries, the intimations in the legisla-
tive history of the Act's segregation provisions, and subsequent dicta
164. See Corcoran & Ervin, supra note 75, at 873, 877.
165. See 17 C.F.R. § 1.22.
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in legal opinions and administrative pronouncements confirming the
creation of such a relationship. Regulators could argue on public pol-
icy grounds that a solvent FCM's capital ought to be used to pay its
customers for losses caused by the default of third parties selected by
such FCM to hold customer funds. The purpose of the minimum fi-
nancial requirements is to avoid customer losses in the event of an
FCM's default. Under this view, the ability to use the "safety cush-
ion" provided by the net capital rules is implicit in the regulations
requiring FCMs to maintain such a cushion.
FCMs could respond by citing the apparent exclusion of the term
"as trust funds" in the legislative history as a rejection of the creation
of a traditional common law fiduciary relationship. Moreover, even if
such a relationship were deemed to exist, an FCM could argue that it
exercised the requisite level of care in selecting the depository institu-
tion. The FCM could do so by demonstrating its compliance with, for
example, the FIA's recommended guidelines.
The presence of exculpatory clauses in an FCM's customer agree-
ment may further complicate the resolution of this issue. As dis-
cussed, though the enforceability of such clauses depends upon the
unique facts and circumstances of each individual case, the case law
nevertheless generally enforces such clauses absent a contrary statu-
tory or regulatory provision. An enforceable exculpatory clause re-
lieving an FCM from liability to its customers for losses caused by the
default of a depository institution arguably may lead to the FCM not
having to reimburse its customer and not being deemed to be
undercapitalized.
Although an enforceable exculpatory clause will not restore the
assets lost through the default of a depository institution, it may elimi-
nate the FCM's liability to customers in the FCM's computation of its
minimum financial requirements, thus potentially permitting an FCM
to continue its business. Under circumstances where the FCM re-
mains a going concern following the failure of a foreign depository
institution, one could reasonably expect the CFTC to object to this
position. Nevertheless, the FCM's response that its customer freely
and knowingly entered into an agreement containing a valid exculpa-
tory clause, might be sustained in a final adjudication.
An enforceable exculpatory clause also may lead to a different
outcome where the FCM is itself forced into bankruptcy following the
default of a depository institution. In such a situation, absent an ex-
culpatory clause as a possible basis for argument, Rule § 190.08 af-
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firmatively obligates an FCM to draw on its own capital by treating
the FCM's capital as "customer property" to the extent funds segre-
gated by the FCM on behalf of its customers are insufficient to meet
the losses incurred. An enforceable exculpatory clause may allow an
FCM to argue that Rule § 190.08 does not apply to the extent that the
customer has taken responsibility for the losses occasioned by the fail-
ure of the depository institution.
CONCLUSION
The United States regulatory system has been singularly success-
ful in protecting customer funds invested in United States futures
markets with exchange member firms from systemic risk. Over the
years, the system has successfully weathered market crashes as well as
several high-profile defaults like Volume Investors and Stotler & Co.
The ability of the system to limit the impact of the default of Barings
plc in February 1995 may be interpreted as yet further proof of its
ability to insulate against such risk. However, at least one area of risk
raised by the Barings crisis - the responsibility of FCMs for losses of
customer funds caused by the default of a depository institution -
was never addressed.
Absent the participation of an institution willing to assume the
margin obligations of the failed depository institution, the ensuing
struggle among FCMs, customers and regulators regarding the respon-
sibility for customer losses, particularly where the FCM remains a go-
ing concern, is almost certain to involve issues regarding the FCM's
care in selecting the depository and the enforceability of an exculpa-
tory clause, if any, in the FCM's customer agreement. As discussed in
this article, the FIA's "Financial Integrity Recommendations" provide
FCMs with guidance as to some of the more salient factors to consider
in selecting depository institutions, including correspondent brokers.
FCMs that have adopted the FIA's recommendations will be better
positioned to disclaim responsibility for customer losses following the
default of a depository institution than those FCMs that have not. In
addition, an FCM that has drafted into its customer agreement an en-
forceable exculpatory clause will have a colorable position that it is
not responsible for customer losses following the default of a deposi-
tory institution. Absent definitive regulatory or judicial guidance,
however, customers, FCMs, and their respective correspondents will
have to deal with the uncertainty surrounding this important link in
the financial integrity chain.
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